Scientific and technological advances are lending pressure to expand the scope of newborn screening. Whereas this has great potential for improving child health, it also challenges our current perception of such programmes. Standard newborn screening programmes are clearly justified by the fact that early detection and treatment of affected individuals avoids significant morbidity and mortality. However, proposals to expand the scope and complexity of such testing are not all supported by a similar level of evidence for unequivocal benefit. We argue (...) that screening for genetic susceptibility to complex disorders is inherently different from standard screening and, while of potential value, must be considered separately from conventional testing. (shrink)

Objectives: To gather information about the practices and attitudes of providers of maternity care with respect to informed consent for newborn screening .Methods: A questionnaire concerning information provision and parental consent for NBS was sent to all 1036 registered lead maternity carers in New Zealand.Results: 93% of LMC in New Zealand report giving parents information concerning NBS, most frequently after delivery and in the third trimester . The majority of LMC currently obtain some form of consent for NBS from parents (...) and consider this to be the ideal approach . Despite this a significant minority of LMC reported considering that NBS should be mandatory. Of those in our survey who believed that NBS should be mandatory, paradoxically most still believed that some form of parental consent should be obtained; of those who believed testing should not be mandatory, only a small proportion would accept parental refusal without question.Conclusions: When the results of this survey are considered in conjunction with existing evidence there appears to be a consensus that good quality information in the prenatal period should be an integral part of any NBS programme. The issue of consent is more complex and there is less agreement on the preferred degree of parental involvement in decisions to allow babies to undergo NBS. A policy that both strongly recommends NBS but also allows parental choice appears to be most consistent with the views of LMC in this survey. (shrink)

How do we refer to people in everyday conversation? No matter the language or culture, we must choose from a range of options: full name ('Robert Smith'), reduced name ('Bob'), description ('tall guy'), kin term ('my son') etc. Our choices reflect how we know that person in context, and allow us to take a particular perspective on them. This book brings together a team of leading linguists, sociologists and anthropologists to show that there is more to person reference than meets (...) the eye. Drawing on video-recorded, everyday interactions in nine languages, it examines the fascinating ways in which we exploit person reference for social and cultural purposes, and reveals the underlying principles of person reference across cultures from the Americas to Asia to the South Pacific. Combining rich ethnographic detail with cross-linguistic generalizations, it will be welcomed by researchers and graduate students interested in the relationship between language and culture. (shrink)

Life, but not as we know it -- Still life in nearly present time -- Driving and the city -- Movement-space -- Afterwords -- From born to made -- Spatialities of feeling -- But malice aforethought -- Turbulent passions.

According to familiar accounts, Rousseau held that humans are actuated by two distinct kinds of self love: amour de soi, a benign concern for one's self-preservation and well-being; and amour-propre, a malign concern to stand above other people, delighting in their despite. I argue that although amour-propre can (and often does) assume this malign form, this is not intrinsic to its character. The first and best rank among men that amour-propre directs us to claim for ourselves is that of occupying (...) 'man's estate'. This does not require, indeed it precludes, subjection of others. Amour-propre does not need suppression or circumscription if we are to live good lives; it rather requires direction to its proper end, not a delusive one. (shrink)

O'Hagan agrees with Dent that in Rousseau's idea of "amour-propre" we encounter a powerful, coherent model of human psychology, according to which individuals find their own identities by engaging in a network of relationships within a more or less reconstituted social order. He examines five ways in which people strive to attain that goal and five ways in which they characteristically fail. In the sixth section he discusses Rousseau's strategy of retreat from society, which is also a retreat from the (...) demands of "amour-propre". (shrink)

Liberal critics of plato's republic criticise him for ignoring the moral autonomy of persons, their right to form and to express their own moral ideas. It is argued that this criticism is superficial. Neither plato, nor his liberal critics, wish all moral views to be held and acted on; they both wish to set limits to what is acceptable. The true source of disagreement is over the scope of reason in human affairs; plato understands that narrowly; his liberal critics in (...) a broad, permissive, way. (shrink)

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In this substantial and challenging book, O’Hagan gives central place to three of Rousseau’s works—the Discourse of Inequality, the Emile, and the Social Contract—which, he says, “constitute the axes of Rousseau’s idea of formation. The formation of the human race is the axis of the Second Discourse, the formation of the individual that of the Emile, and the formation of the citizen that of the Social Contract”. However, he also draws extensively on other material, particularly Julie, ou la Nouvelle Héloïse, (...) to extend and deepen some of Rousseau’s accounts, particularly of moral and psychological issues. Such selectivity enables O’Hagan to consider in some detail each of his chosen texts, which he does with persistent intensity and rigor, in chapters 2 to 6, devoting three of these chapters to his treatment of the Social Contract. Additionally, he selects certain topics for particular attention, with individual chapters on amour-propre, on Rousseau’s views about men and women, on Rousseau’s treatment of some issues concerning language, and he closes with an extended treatment of Rousseau’s religious ideas and views about the role of religion in society. It is pleasing to see this aspect of Rousseau’s thought, which is seldom considered at length these days, dealt with with such care. Another useful aspect of O’Hagan’s discussion is that he makes available and engages with some of the ideas of leading French critics of Rousseau, which helpfully broadens the horizons of the assessments he makes. (shrink)

In this substantial and challenging book, O’Hagan gives central place to three of Rousseau’s works—the Discourse of Inequality, the Emile, and the Social Contract—which, he says, “constitute the axes of Rousseau’s idea of formation. The formation of the human race is the axis of the Second Discourse, the formation of the individual that of the Emile, and the formation of the citizen that of the Social Contract”. However, he also draws extensively on other material, particularly Julie, ou la Nouvelle Héloïse, (...) to extend and deepen some of Rousseau’s accounts, particularly of moral and psychological issues. Such selectivity enables O’Hagan to consider in some detail each of his chosen texts, which he does with persistent intensity and rigor, in chapters 2 to 6, devoting three of these chapters to his treatment of the Social Contract. Additionally, he selects certain topics for particular attention, with individual chapters on amour-propre, on Rousseau’s views about men and women, on Rousseau’s treatment of some issues concerning language, and he closes with an extended treatment of Rousseau’s religious ideas and views about the role of religion in society. It is pleasing to see this aspect of Rousseau’s thought, which is seldom considered at length these days, dealt with with such care. Another useful aspect of O’Hagan’s discussion is that he makes available and engages with some of the ideas of leading French critics of Rousseau, which helpfully broadens the horizons of the assessments he makes. (shrink)

This note discusses critically a point in a d m walker's paper "the ideal of sincerity" ("mind", October 1978). Walker claims that desires are insincere if corrupted by incompatible desires. This view accounts for some cases, But not for all. It is argued, In the note, That superficial, Factitious, 'got up' desires are judged insincere as such because not 'natural' to a man. This is implied by the claim of andre gide's which walker misinterprets. The issue of natural desires in (...) contrast to artificial desires introduces the question of 'authenticity', Which is looked at in connection with lionel trilling's "sincerity and authenticity". (shrink)

Did Alcidamas invent the story of the contest of Homer and Hesiod? Martin West has argued that he did , 433 ff.). I believe that there are a number of reasons for thinking this improbable. The stories of the deaths of Homer and Hesiod were traditional before Alcidamas. Heraclitus knew the legend of the riddle of the lice and Homer's death , and the story of Hesiod's death was well known by Thucydides’ time . The first attempt to record information (...) about Homer's life is ascribed to Theagenes of Rhegium, in the late sixth century b.c. . By that time it seems likely that there was already a considerable body of legends about the early poets. The pieces of hexameter verse in the Herodotean Life of Homer, some of which show detailed knowledge of the area around Smyrna in the archaic period, probably date from before 500 b.c. In relating the stories of the poets’ deaths Alcidamas is recording the results of στορα, and this is what he implies in Michigan papyrus 2754 . West's theory requires one to assume that he has incorporated with these traditions his own fiction of the contest. This seems to me to go against what we know in general about the activity of sophists such as Alcidamas. Although they were capable of inventing myths , there is no evidence that they created such stories about earlier historical figures, rather than collecting popular legends about them, and using these for their own purposes. It is true that Critias used the evidence of Archilochus’ own poetry to draw conclusions about his life . But this is not the same as inventing a story virtually from scratch. Hesiod's own testimony about his poetic victory , the original starting-point for the legend of the contest with Homer, did not on its own provide a basis from which such inferences could be drawn. It seems more likely that the legend is the product of earlier popular embroidery, at a time when speculation about these early poets’ lives was becoming common. (shrink)

The Homeric Scholia are not the most obvious source for literary criticism in the modern sense. And yet if one takes the trouble to read through them one will find many valuable observations about poetic technique and poetic qualities. Nowadays we tend to emphasize different aspects from those which preoccupied ancient critics, but that may be a good reason for looking again at what they have to say.